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FEATURES OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR PARADIGM AFTER A FULL-SCALE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE

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Abstract

Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has put on the agenda the question of consolidating the international community's efforts in order to oppose Russian aggression in Europe and create conditions for preventing armed confrontations in the future. Without exaggeration, it can be stated that the European Union plays a special role in creating a system of collective repulsion of the aggressor and ensuring its effective functioning. Its unprecedented "geopolitical awakening" in response to another Russian aggression against Ukraine has immediately become the subject of numerous scientific investigations by foreign and domestic experts. In addition, the change in the behavioral logic used by the EU in defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine between 2014, when the Russian Federation's armed invasion of Crimea took place, and the events of February 2022 has not gone unnoticed by scholars.

The article analyzes the main behavioral models of foreign policy actors and also makes the assumption that Russia's full-scale military offensive against Ukraine, which destroyed the established European security architecture, has led to the transformation of the behavioral paradigm of the EU, which is primarily seen in the change of its foreign policy goals. The conducted analysis of the EU's behavioral logic confirmed the assumption and allowed us to conclude that before the invasion, the bloc acted as an actor pursuing a policy of the status quo, but after – its role changed to a normative one.

Keywords: policy of status quo, normative foreign policy actor, Russian-Ukrainian war, normative power, EU's role, behavioral logic of foreign policy actors, rashism, EU's foreign policy behavior paradigm

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНОЇ ПОВЕДІНКОВОЇ ПАРАДИГМИ ЄС ПІСЛЯ ПОВНОМАСШТАБНОГО РОСІЙСЬКОГО ВТОРГНЕННЯ В УКРАЇНУ

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Анотація

Повномасштабне військове вторгнення Росії в Україну, розпочате 24 лютого 2022 року, поставило на порядок денний питання про консолідацію зусиль міжнародної спільноти з метою протистояння російській агресії в Європі та створення умов для недопущення збройних протистоянь у майбутньому. Без перебільшення можна стверджувати, що особливу роль у створенні системи колективної відсічі агресору та забезпеченні її ефективного функціонування відіграє Європейський Союз. Його безпрецедентне “геополітичне пробудження” у відповідь на чергову агресію Росії проти України одразу стало предметом численних наукових розвідок закордонних та вітчизняних фахівців.

У статті проаналізовано основні поведінкові моделі акторів зовнішньої політики, а також зроблено припущення, що воєнний повномасштабний наступ Росії на Україну, що зруйнував стверджену архітектуру європейської безпеки, призвів до трансформації поведінкової парадигми ЄС, яка насамперед вбачається у зміні його зовнішньополітичних цілей. Проведений аналіз поведінкової логіки ЄС підтвердив припущення та дозволив дійти висновку, що до вторгнення блок діяв як актор, що реалізує політику “статус-кво”, натомість після – його роль змінилася на нормативну.

Ключові слова: політика статусу-кво, нормативний актор зовнішньої політики, російсько-українська війна, нормативна сила, роль ЄС, поведінкова логіка акторів зовнішньої політики, рашизм, зовнішньополітична поведінкова парадигма ЄС

Problem statement. Russia’s impunity for the occupation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as for fueling armed conflicts in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, Syria, etc., has given rise to its sense of omnipotence and permissiveness and has ultimately led to the initiation by it of a large-scale catastrophic military attack on the territory of sovereign Ukraine in February 2022. This offensive which was accompanied by the “biggest mobilisation of troops since the second world war” (Wintour, 2022), quickly turned into a full-scale war of attrition, partially similar in its intensity to the one that took place between Egypt and Israel from March 1969 to August 1970.

In fact, we are witnessing the first war in history, in which the subjects of international law, especially the NATO member states, although they could potentially directly confront a nuclear state, accelerate the de-occupation of all territory of Ukraine and compel Russia to withdraw its military forces from the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, but have chosen another way: to deliberately refrain from providing direct physical protection of Ukraine, instead giving a comprehensive range of diplomatic, military, financial and humanitarian support, in order to prevent the worst-case scenarios on Russian war in Ukraine, in particular, those that predict the possible escalation to a

Russia-NATO conflict and expansion of current war to the world level (or even to a global all-out nuclear war). It is debatable whether the physical participation of the Alliance member states in this war can really provoke, for example, the third world war (or, at least, its exacerbation)¹. Rather, the complete inaction of the international community in response to the Russian invasion (or such a weak reaction of the West, which was observed to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014) can lead to such a scenario.

It should be emphasized that attempts to prevent a more acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war were repeatedly made by the leaders of Western countries. In particular, on the eve of the invasion, during a video call with Russian President V. Putin, President Joe Biden voiced deep concerns on behalf of the U.S. and the European Allies about Russia's escalation of forces surrounding Ukraine and called on Russia to return to diplomacy, making it clear that the West would respond with strong economic and other measures in the event of military escalation (The White House, 2021).

During the telephone conversation with V. Putin that took place four days before the start of the Russian invasion, the President of France, I. Macron also called for a reduction in tension along the Ukrainian border by withdrawing Russian troops to a safe distance and even received a favourable response from Putin to his proposal to hold a bilateral meeting with the Americans, and then an extended meeting with the European counterparts on the security situation in eastern Ukraine (Le Temps, 2022). Despite the diplomatic efforts of the international community, Russian troops invaded the territory of Ukraine, thereby once again proving that the Kremlin is not ready to voluntarily give up its imperial ambitions and territorial claims, move to a democratic path of development and act in accordance with the principles of international law.

Instead of the lightning-fast “capture of Kyiv in three days”², the Russian Federation has only achieved the dispelling of the EU's illusions regarding the possibility of peaceful coexistence with it and has provoked an unprecedented geopolitical awakening of the bloc, which it did not demonstrate in response to any other manifestations of Russian aggression in the past. Therefore, there is no doubt that the recent Russian invasion has become a serious test for European foreign policy cooperation and has significantly expanded the limits of EU member states' actions that member states have been willing to undertake in order to restore a sovereign country's territorial integrity and, in general, to ensure peace in the region.

The article suggests the hypothesis, which is that the EU's behavior after the events of February 2022 characterizes it as a real normative power and is manifestly different from that which it demonstrated from the moment of the first Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014 until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Thus, **the purpose of the article** is to prove or disprove whether the EU is assigned the role of a normative

¹ Every war is unique and the physical involvement of third parties in it can, depending on various circumstances and factors, both contribute to its resolution and, on the contrary, hinder it. History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, but some experts and policymakers deeply immersed in the topic of war sometimes allow themselves to assume that the timely introduction of foreign military contingents to certain active conflicts of the past could have saved hundreds of thousands of human lives. For example, B. Clinton, the 42nd president of the USA, in his speech, which later became known as the «Clinton Apology», acknowledges America's failure to stop genocide in Rwanda (CBS Interactive Inc, 1998). In his interviews, he repeatedly emphasized that sending around 10,000 troops to Rwanda in 1994 could have saved thousands of lives of the local population (CNN, 2012). Undoubtedly, in the case of nuclear-armed Russia, which from the first days of the invasion of Ukraine threatened any country that tried to interfere in Ukraine with “consequences greater than any you have faced in history” (Buncombe, 2022), the introduction of foreign troops, in particular from the United States, in order to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine is a rather risky step. However, despite the riskiness of the situation, one should also take into account the potential consequences of an insufficient international community's response to the destruction of the European security architecture by Russia, which may lead to the unprecedented global-scale destruction in the future.

² The message about the potential capability of the Russian army to capture Kyiv in three days has been being spread by Russian propagandists since the beginning of the full-scale invasion (Khaled, 2023). This is not the first time that Russia has issued similar threats to seize Ukraine. E.g., in 2014, V. Putin told J.M. Barroso, a former President of the European Commission, that he could take Kiev in two weeks if he wanted to (Roth, 2014).

foreign policy actor in the second phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war³ in contrast to the first phase, when its behavior was only acquiring the characteristics of normativeness.

Analysis of previous research and publications. Foreign policy behaviour paradigms within which different states of the world exist have always been in the focus of scientists' attention. Thus, the analysis of the features of different paradigms (the normative, the imperial, the realpolitik, or the status quo) was carried out at different points in time, in particular, by I. Manners (Manners, 2002), N. Tocci (Tocci, 2008), M. Kahler (Kahler, 2023), H. Janusch (Janusch, 2016), T. Risse (Risse, 2000), H.J. Morgenthau (Morgenthau, 1948), J. Elster (Elster, 1989, 2015), and others. Attempts to determine the behavioural logic of the EU in specific cases have been carried out, *inter alia*, by C. Portela (Portela, 2022), R.H. Santini (Santini, 2010), etc. For their part R.H. Maurer, R.G. Whitman, N. Wright (Maurer, Whitman, & Wright, 2023), etc. focus special attention in their publications on the role of the EU in the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, despite the significant interest of scientists in this topic, some of its insufficiently studied theoretical aspects still remain, which necessitates their further studies.

Foreign policy behavior paradigms. Outlining the main paradigms of foreign policy behaviour within which the normative, the realpolitik, the imperial and the status quo actors exist will allow us to correctly determine in what role the EU acted in the first phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war and how / whether this role changed in the second phase.

The normative paradigm assumes that the normative foreign policy actors are «out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries» and strengthening international law (Wolfers, 1962: 74). In addition, such actors act in accordance with the logic of appropriateness: they comply with all-encompassing norms such as peace, democracy, justice, etc., “even if these norms minimize their utility, because they consider this behavior appropriate” (Janusch, 2016: 6; Kahler, 1998: 919-941). Accordingly, their normative foreign policy goals (or “the milieu goals”, as A. Wolfers refers to it (Wolfers, 1962: 74)) which would in turn include the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, international law, sustainable development, etc.⁴ are pursued consistently over time, and not only at the time when such goals also represent immediate possession goals (Tocci, 2008: 7). At the same time, as rightly pointed out by T. Risse, a well-known international relations scholar, normative actors “try to do the right thing rather than maximizing or optimizing their given preference” (Risse, 2000: 4).

It should also be noted that in the process of implementing its foreign policy course, a real normative actor is guided by the logic of arguing – i.e. acts taking into account several basic rules of behaviour: actors use arguments to persuade other parties, and persuasion in this sense excludes threat, sanction, coercion or reward⁵; actors are willing to be persuaded by a better argument; physical power is absent from any discourse about norms (Janusch, 2016: 6; Risse, 2000: 3-23). Thus, unlike a hegemon, an empire or a great

³ The first phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war refers to the period from the moment of Russian armed forces' invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in February-March 2014 to the time of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022.

⁴ For their part, A. Lieven and J.C. Hulsmann considered goals such as the search for compromise, stability, etc. as having a real normative content.

⁵ At the same time, it is a mistake to believe that the use of negative incentives such as sanctions is a sign of non-normative behavior of the actor. Negative incentives, as well as positive ones, can fall under the definition of “means having normative nature”, if they are used in a legitimate way – i.e. in the ethically good way as to take into account the interests of all political equals, the external legal commitments and the legal commitments towards itself – in order to «encourage others to participate in a dialogue about norms”, which in fact means to achieve the desired normative impact in the form of partnership, to “pressure participating actors to accept other participants in an open dialogue”, and to punish actors who deprive the participating actor of opportunities to further develop cooperative relations with other participating actors (Føllesdal, 2006: 156; Sjørnsen, 2006: 245; Manners, 2008: 45-60; Janusch, 2016: 9-10). Moreover, refraining from using negative incentives in some cases outlined above, on the contrary, will indicate that the actor is non-normative.

power that are considered as aggressive, martial, and evil, the normative power more often uses positive incentives⁶ such as diplomatic means, social aid, technical assistance, etc. to have a major impact on other actors⁷, demonstrates the ideational power rather than material or physical, and conducts politics guided by morals, justice, human rights, democracy, and free markets (Telò, 2006; Whitman, 1998; Manners, 2002, 2009).

In this context, it is important to note that although a normative foreign policy actor refrains from a “position of strength” in international relations, as H. Janusch refers to it (Janusch, 2016), this does not mean that it should refuse to use and accumulate hard power. Such a refusal in today’s conditions, when there are still states that continue to be governed by the laws of the jungle (Cooper, 2004: 61-62), will rather be perceived as powerlessness or military weakness of the actor. In general, it is not the absence of the possibility of using hard power means, but the very relinquishment of such a possibility in favour of more acceptable soft methods where possible characterizes the actor as normative (Janusch, 2016: 8).

Apart from the normative power that complies with *jus cogens* norms in accordance with the logic of appropriateness and is characterized by means having normative nature to achieve normative foreign policy goals, there are also three main types of actors such as *realpolitik*, imperial and status quo which display non-normative patterns of foreign policy. *Realpolitik* foreign policy actors behave according to the logic of consequentialism – i.e. use any foreign policy means (both coercive and non-coercive policy instruments⁸) in a way not authorized by international law⁹ to achieve the possession goal (that is, to maximize its material benefits and gains, including economic and geopolitical ones) (Janusch, 2016: 5-7, 10; Tocci, 2008: 12-13; Wolfers, 1962: 73-74). Accordingly, they refuse to abide by a certain norm if it minimizes benefits. Alongside, such actors often use hard power to advance their interests and not open to “persuasion by superior argument”, as well as rarely deviate from their usual line of conduct (Janusch, 2016: 6).

As for the imperial foreign policy actors, they don’t consider themselves as bound by existing law, just like the *realpolitik* ones. Such actors as empires, hegemons or civilian powers pursue normative foreign policy goals, which are not reduced to the maximization of benefits, but to one: the imposition of certain norms, which they themselves directly observe (Janusch, 2016: 6-7, 10-11; Tocci, 2008: 13; Wolfers, 1962: 73-74). As rightly pointed out by H.J. Morgenthau, a policy of imperialism is pursued by such a state «whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has through expansion of its power beyond its frontiers ...[and] seeks a favourable change in power status» (Morgenthau, 1948: 21).

At the same time, the imperial type of actor «will not be concerned with the truth implicit in its norms» (Janusch, 2016: 7). The process of convincing states of the need to adapt certain norms is carried out by such an actor by using non-normative foreign policy means (in accordance with the logic of consequentialism). The likelihood that the empire will change its behaviour under the pressure of the normative actor’s argumentative power is actually reduced to zero, as in the case of the *realpolitik* foreign policy actor. And finally, the status quo actors are characterized by the fact that their foreign policy «tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in their favour» (Morgenthau, 1948: 21).

⁶ More details about different instruments of normative power such as “contagion”, “cultural filter” “transference” etc. can be found in the publication by I. Manners “Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms?” (Manners, 2002).

⁷ In turn, normative impact should involve socialisation, partnership, and ownership (Tocci, 2008: 9; Manners, 2002: 3-4).

⁸ With that, foreign policy instruments “are valued and chosen not for themselves, but as more or less efficient means to a further end”. (Elster, 1989: 22-24).

⁹ That is, foreign policy means are often used by *realpolitik* actors even if it is prohibited by several internal and international legal acts.

Such actors do not seek to achieve normative foreign policy goals, and, choosing between acting and doing nothing, they “will not act if the expected utility costs of acting exceed the expected utility benefits” (the logic of consequentialism) (Elster, 2015: 256-257; Tocci, 2008: 12-13). Status quo foreign policy actors try to develop such a format of interaction with other states that involves no more than minimal risk for themselves. In addition, they prefer means having normative nature to achieve the desired goals, relinquish physical strength in the norm diffusion process, and pursue their policies in respect of their domestic and international legal obligations (Diez & Manners, 2007; Tocci, 2008).

The EU's status quo foreign policy towards Ukraine (2014-2022). The EU is often criticized for its rather weak reaction to the Crimean Peninsula's occupation by Russian troops in 2014 and war instigation in eastern Ukraine by pro-Russian and Russian military groups, which was accompanied by their active recruitment of mercenaries to participate in hostilities on the side of the terrorist organizations of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. Despite the fact that the Russian intervention in Ukraine had a deep symbolic meaning for the EU, since it undermined its values of peace, democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, etc., which in turn constitute the normative foundation of the European integration project, the bloc's member states limited themselves to only declaring the goal of restoring Ukraine's sovereign rights¹⁰, not to its immediate achievement. In other words, the EU was not ready to abandon the established strategy of coexistence with Russia, despite the Kremlin's brazen violation of the principles of international law, as well as to prevent its member states from pursuing pro-Russian policies, which gave them certain material and other benefits. The facts that EU member states used to sign new trade¹¹, energy and other agreements with Russia¹² (Eurostat, 2015; Kardaś & Sadecki, 2021; Istrate, 2021), supply it with components for various types of military equipment (The Observatory of Economic Complexity), feed its financial power needed for the future prosecution of the war against Ukraine by purchasing Russian energy resources (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2016), conduct negotiations with the head of the Kremlin regarding the further development of cooperation (Gardner, 2014), grant port access for Russian naval forces (Saunders, 2015), etc. serve as another confirmation that the EU pursued far from normative foreign policy goals during the first stages of the Russian-Ukrainian war – i.e. acted in accordance with the logic of consequentialism in the process of norm compliance.

In general, the EU's reaction to the Russian intervention can be characterized as paradoxical because, despite the desire to keep relations with Russia, the bloc nevertheless deliberately took steps that could potentially worsen them and did not express complete indifference to the Ukrainian issue, which Russia hoped for. That is, the EU did not act entirely in compliance with the logic of consequentialism in the norm defence process. Moreover, its behavior began to show the first signs of normativity: by unanimously agreeing to the introduction of surprisingly strong sanctions against Russia (The Council of the EU and the European Council) and publicly condemning the Kremlin's actions (Mission of Ukraine to the European Union 2020, 2021), the bloc made it clear that it is ready to neglect its own interests for the sake of values such as peace, security, human

¹⁰ Such goals were fixed, in particular, in the Joint Communication on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (18.11.2015), the Implementation plan on security and defence (14.11.2016), Conclusions of the European Council (20/21 March 2014), the Minsk Protocol (19.09.2014) and other legal documents of the EU.

¹¹ In addition, in 2014, the share of Russia in the total trade of EU goods continued to be high: Russia was among the top 3 main countries of origin of goods imported into the EU (Eurostat, 2015). Moreover, in 2021, Russia was the 3rd largest partner for EU imports of goods and the 5th largest partner for EU exports of goods (Eurostat, 2022).

¹² Although there was growing concern in the EU about energy dependence on Russia, no action was taken to reduce such dependence (Communication COM (2014) 330 final). Moreover, on the contrary, Germany decided to go ahead with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, designed to double the flow of Russian gas direct to Germany and make Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian pressure (Janjevic, 2018).

rights, etc¹³. In addition, the European leaders were looking for formats for a peaceful settlement of the war¹⁴, which can be seen as the EU's desire to act as a normative power.

The listed restrictive and diplomatic measures can hardly be called effective in terms of forcing Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territories, but there is no doubt that since their use was legitimately justified, such measures were considered to be of a normative nature. In this context, it should be noted that the fact of refraining from military force and the use of such foreign policy means, which are designed primarily to restore peace in Europe and not to achieve the subordination or termination of the physical existence of the aggressor country, in response to Russia's actions reflect the self-definition of the EU «as that of a non-geopolitical, post-historic entity» (Wolczuk, 2016: 59) (or “anti-geopolitical unit”, as S. Guzzini refers to it (Guzzini, 2012: 62)). On the other hand, Russia perceived the EU's reluctance to resolve the situation in Ukraine through the use of direct physical force not as a sign of normativity in the bloc's behavior, but rather as a «sign of weakness, an open invitation to its own military solution» (Auer, 2015: 955).

Precisely because the EU pretended to be fully committed to its declared goals in relation to Ukraine, one could get the impression that the EU was acting as a normative foreign policy actor. However, in reality, the EU kept the hypocritical facade of this type of actor, because the very fact of the announcement of such goals served only as a symbolic gesture for many of its member states. Alongside that, the declared goals were significantly inferior to the priorities of the above-mentioned non-normative goal of preserving the status quo in relations with Russia. Thus, the EU's non-normative priorities at that time made it impossible to apply a comprehensive approach that would involve the use of the entire arsenal of more effective means of influence on Russia.

Therefore, taking into account all of the above, it can be concluded that during the first stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the EU acted as a status quo foreign policy actor.

The EU's normative foreign policy towards Ukraine (2022 – ongoing). Already at the stage of the EU's entry into the second phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, there were several signs that the European bloc began to assert itself as a real normative power. Firstly, the very fact that the European Union decided to resist nuclear Russia in order to restore peace in Ukraine immediately¹⁵, despite knowing all possible risks and the potential loss of financial benefits, characterizes it as normative. I.e. in this case, such a decision to oppose the aggression of Russia, which undermines European values, is consistent with the logic of appropriateness – the behavioral logic of normative foreign policy actors. Secondly, the EU began to involve its partners in the collective counteraction against Russia¹⁶, which violated jus cogens norms, by activating the policy of normative power¹⁷, as well as immediately made it clear that the coordination of further joint steps

¹³ H. Sjørnsen and G. Rosén are also inclined to think that the collective reaction (the efficiency of which can be questioned) was triggered by a «concurrence over a fundamental breach of the Ukrainians' right to self-determination» and not by a «concern for security» and the «institutionalization of a norm of cohesion». This once again confirms that norms may trump interests (Sjørnsen & Rosén, 2016: 20-21).

¹⁴ The leaders of EU member states, particularly E. Macron and O. Scholz, played a significant role in enabling the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine and subsequent peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. These talks resulted in the two Minsk agreements. It is worth noting that German propensity to dialogue, through these agreements, led Ukraine to make concessions that favored Russian interests (Meister, 2015).

¹⁵ In particular, in a joint statement, the members of the European Council clearly indicate their intention to “impose massive and severe consequences on Russia for its action”, in close coordination with their transatlantic partners (The European Council, 2022).

¹⁶ As rightly pointed out by researchers H. Maurer, R.G. Whitman and N. Wright, the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine highlights “the potential of its foreign policy system to enact meaningful collective diplomacy” (Maurer, Whitman, & Wright, 2023: 220).

¹⁷ Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the EU has been using various instruments of normative power to mobilize the efforts of its partners. In particular, the bloc has been using the instrument of “contagion” in order to demonstrate to the world a successful example of responding to such a flagrant act of the Kremlin's aggression against a sovereign Ukraine. In combination with other instruments, “contagion” has turned out to be quite effective because other subjects of international law have adopted the behavior of the EU, supporting its desire to restore peace in Ukraine and joining the collective fight against Russia. More details about different instruments of normative power can be found in the publication by I. Manners “Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms?”.

with its neighbours and international partners, including NATO and G7, would take place in the format of an open dialogue (The European Council, 2022). Thirdly, since the invasion, the EU has been refraining from using direct military power against Russia (or from “position of strength”, as H. Janusch refers to it (Janusch, 2016: 8)), instead choosing such foreign policy means, the use of which would not threaten the physical existence of Russia, but would only force it to stop the occupation of sovereign Ukraine.

Among the normative foreign pol goals that the EU seeks to achieve after a full-scale invasion, one can single out the following: 1) to restore the conditions under which Ukraine will be able to fully exercise its sovereign rights and to strengthen the normative dialogue with the EU in various areas of mutual interest, particularly in the area of climate change (and this can be achieved only after the withdrawal of Russian troops from its entire territory, including Crimea); 2) to overthrow the rashysm regime in order to prevent wars in the future and weaken those foreign policy actors who contribute to the strengthening of this regime (it is primarily about Belarus and Iran, which support Russia in this war); and 3) to unite as many subjects of international relations both in the European region and beyond as possible to achieve the goals of the EU’s normative foreign policy strategy. It should be noted that such goals are achieved by the EU through both normative and non-normative means, which will be discussed in more detail below. Since they are employed in a way authorized by international law and are fully compliant with external legal commitments undertaken by the EU, they can be attributed to the category of means having normative nature.

To achieve the first two goals, the EU uses a multipronged approach. On the one hand, it provides comprehensive support to Ukraine, including macro-financial support in the amount of 2.5 billion euros for direct military assistance to Ukraine within the framework of the recently created European Peace Facility (The Council of the EU and the European Council, 2022). The EU has been helping Ukrainian refugees and has also been providing training to the Ukrainian military within the framework of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine. It is important that this mission is aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the ongoing war and to provide the opportunity to respond appropriately to “possible future military offensives by Russia and other potential aggressors” (EUMAM Ukraine). Alongside these measures, another important step to support Ukraine is granting it candidate status for EU membership in June 2022 (Conclusions EUCO 24/22). On the other hand, the EU works in the direction of weakening Russia by introducing financial and trade sanctions against it, excluding key Russian banks from the SWIFT system (European Commission, 2 March 2022), reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources (Communication COM(2022)), halting scientific cooperation with Russia (European Commission, 2022), etc.

The third goal of the NFPS is achieved by the EU, in particular, by increasing, strengthening, and activating normative ties in the European region and beyond, which in turn becomes possible thanks to the representation of EU interests by member states in various international organizations and interregional initiatives. I.e., thanks to its well-established partnerships with states and organizations worldwide, the EU can successfully exercise normative impact on numerous sovereign entities, involving them in the collective struggle to restore peace in Ukraine and in achieving other goals enshrined in its normative foreign policy strategy.

One can argue about the effectiveness of the EU’s normative foreign policy strategy in terms of resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war and other potential conflicts in the future with its help, but there is no doubt that thanks to this strategy, the bloc’s member states have been managing to provide powerful normative impulses to stimulate the international community’s relentless struggle against the Russian occupiers.

Conclusion. In the period from 2014 to the full-scale invasion in 2022, the EU preferred to keep the status quo in relations with Russia (i.e. pursued a non-normative foreign policy goal): its member states actively signed new deals with the Kremlin,

developed trade relations, etc. Since Russia violated basic European values by invading Ukraine, the EU's lack of proper response to this crime suggests that the bloc acted in accordance with the logic of consequentialism in the process of norm compliance.

Alongside that, it should be noted that the EU did not completely abandon the normative goal of helping Ukraine to restore peace, but this goal gave way to the bloc's desire not to worsen relations with Russia in any way. The European bloc agreed to a strengthened sanctions' regime against Russia in accordance with the logic of arguing. That is, in this case, it introduced sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, while not violating the norms and principles of international law, which means that the restrictive measures served as means having normative nature. Another evidences that the desire to achieve the restoration of Ukraine's sovereign rights was inferior to the EU's desire to preserve the status quo in relations with the Kremlin were the calls for a transition to a more flexible sanctions policy against Russia in exchange for alleged progress in eastern Ukraine and, in principle, the choice of sanctions as the main means of pressure on the aggressor country, despite the fact that the historical record of sanctions indicates that they are unlikely to bring an end to this war (Drezner, 2011).

Therefore, given the above, one can draw the conclusion that during the first stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the EU acted within the framework of the status quo foreign policy behavior paradigm. At the same time, a part of the hypothesis of the article is confirmed because, indeed, during the specified period, the behavior of the EU was acquiring the features of normativity. This is evidenced, in particular, by the bloc's condemnation of the aggressive actions of Russia, the introduction of a sanctions regime against it by a unanimous decision, the EU's non-recognition policy towards temporarily occupied Crimea, etc.

It is quite expected that the war launched by Russia in Ukraine, which has been accompanied by the Kremlin's threats to use tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear blackmail at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, provocation of ecocide and a global food crisis through the destruction of Ukraine's grain terminals, forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, etc., significantly expanded the limits of action and the list of foreign policy means to which the EU is ready to resort in response to a disruption of Europe's security architecture, as well as led to a change in the foreign policy behaviour paradigm in which the EU used to exist (the hypothesis of the article got some experimental backing). Thus, we are witnessing the process of formation and implementation of the first normative foreign policy strategy of the EU in a war situation. It proposes a comprehensive approach to restoring peace in Europe by providing assistance to Ukraine, in particular through the training of Ukrainian military personnel, the activation of NATO member states to provide security guarantees to Ukraine in the future, the imposition of maximum diplomatic and economic pressure through sanctions on Russia, and the involvement of as many foreign policy actors as possible in the collective pushback against Russia, which, in turn, may slow down significantly or not happen at all due to the insusceptibility of some states, especially where an autocratic regime reigns, to the normative impulse of the EU. Without a doubt, there is an urgent need to analyse the effectiveness of the EU's policy of normative power as it currently exists in dealing with nuclear non-normative Russia and other potential aggressors. In the case of identifying facts that indicate its ineffectiveness in the current war, it should be quickly transformed, because a peaceful future for all of Europe is at stake. Alongside this, the features of the interaction and harmonisation of the strategies, developed by various actors of international relations for the renewal of the territorial integrity of Ukraine with internationally recognized borders, with the existing EU's normative foreign policy strategy also require a detailed analysis.

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